From b4e3645f81cea70c28bb5f91bcd2fffc002cba71 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: rusty <rusty>
Date: Mon, 15 May 2000 02:17:52 +0000
Subject: Philip Blundell's IPv6 fixes.

---
 libiptc/libip6tc.c | 123 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 121 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'libiptc/libip6tc.c')

diff --git a/libiptc/libip6tc.c b/libiptc/libip6tc.c
index 10bcf5a..dae85eb 100644
--- a/libiptc/libip6tc.c
+++ b/libiptc/libip6tc.c
@@ -60,9 +60,10 @@ typedef unsigned int socklen_t;
 
 #define TC_DUMP_ENTRIES		dump_entries6
 #define TC_IS_CHAIN		ip6tc_is_chain
+#define TC_FIRST_CHAIN		ip6tc_first_chain
 #define TC_NEXT_CHAIN		ip6tc_next_chain
-#define TC_NUM_RULES		ip6tc_num_rules
-#define TC_GET_RULE		ip6tc_get_rule
+#define TC_FIRST_RULE		ip6tc_first_rule
+#define TC_NEXT_RULE		ip6tc_next_rule
 #define TC_GET_TARGET		ip6tc_get_target
 #define TC_BUILTIN		ip6tc_builtin
 #define TC_GET_POLICY		ip6tc_get_policy
@@ -263,3 +264,121 @@ is_same(const STRUCT_ENTRY *a, const STRUCT_ENTRY *b,
 
 	return 1;
 }
+
+#ifndef NDEBUG
+/* Do every conceivable sanity check on the handle */
+static void
+do_check(TC_HANDLE_T h, unsigned int line)
+{
+	unsigned int i, n;
+	unsigned int user_offset; /* Offset of first user chain */
+	int was_return;
+
+	assert(h->changed == 0 || h->changed == 1);
+	if (strcmp(h->info.name, "filter") == 0) {
+		assert(h->info.valid_hooks
+		       == (1 << NF_IP6_LOCAL_IN
+			   | 1 << NF_IP6_FORWARD
+			   | 1 << NF_IP6_LOCAL_OUT));
+
+		/* Hooks should be first three */
+		assert(h->info.hook_entry[NF_IP6_LOCAL_IN] == 0);
+
+		n = get_chain_end(h, 0);
+		n += get_entry(h, n)->next_offset;
+		assert(h->info.hook_entry[NF_IP6_FORWARD] == n);
+
+		n = get_chain_end(h, n);
+		n += get_entry(h, n)->next_offset;
+		assert(h->info.hook_entry[NF_IP6_LOCAL_OUT] == n);
+
+		user_offset = h->info.hook_entry[NF_IP6_LOCAL_OUT];
+	} else if (strcmp(h->info.name, "nat") == 0) {
+		assert(h->info.valid_hooks
+		       == (1 << NF_IP6_PRE_ROUTING
+			   | 1 << NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING
+			   | 1 << NF_IP6_LOCAL_OUT));
+
+		assert(h->info.hook_entry[NF_IP6_PRE_ROUTING] == 0);
+
+		n = get_chain_end(h, 0);
+		n += get_entry(h, n)->next_offset;
+		assert(h->info.hook_entry[NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING] == n);
+
+		n = get_chain_end(h, n);
+		n += get_entry(h, n)->next_offset;
+		assert(h->info.hook_entry[NF_IP6_LOCAL_OUT] == n);
+
+		user_offset = h->info.hook_entry[NF_IP6_LOCAL_OUT];
+	} else if (strcmp(h->info.name, "mangle") == 0) {
+		assert(h->info.valid_hooks
+		       == (1 << NF_IP6_PRE_ROUTING
+			   | 1 << NF_IP6_LOCAL_OUT));
+
+		/* Hooks should be first three */
+		assert(h->info.hook_entry[NF_IP6_PRE_ROUTING] == 0);
+
+		n = get_chain_end(h, 0);
+		n += get_entry(h, n)->next_offset;
+		assert(h->info.hook_entry[NF_IP6_LOCAL_OUT] == n);
+
+		user_offset = h->info.hook_entry[NF_IP6_LOCAL_OUT];
+	} else
+		abort();
+
+	/* User chain == end of last builtin + policy entry */
+	user_offset = get_chain_end(h, user_offset);
+	user_offset += get_entry(h, user_offset)->next_offset;
+
+	/* Overflows should be end of entry chains, and unconditional
+           policy nodes. */
+	for (i = 0; i < NUMHOOKS; i++) {
+		STRUCT_ENTRY *e;
+		STRUCT_STANDARD_TARGET *t;
+
+		if (!(h->info.valid_hooks & (1 << i)))
+			continue;
+		assert(h->info.underflow[i]
+		       == get_chain_end(h, h->info.hook_entry[i]));
+
+		e = get_entry(h, get_chain_end(h, h->info.hook_entry[i]));
+//		assert(unconditional(&e->ipv6));
+		assert(e->target_offset == sizeof(*e));
+		t = (STRUCT_STANDARD_TARGET *)GET_TARGET(e);
+		assert(t->target.u.target_size == ALIGN(sizeof(*t)));
+		assert(e->next_offset == sizeof(*e) + ALIGN(sizeof(*t)));
+
+		assert(strcmp(t->target.u.user.name, STANDARD_TARGET)==0);
+		assert(t->verdict == -NF_DROP-1 || t->verdict == -NF_ACCEPT-1);
+
+		/* Hooks and underflows must be valid entries */
+		entry2index(h, get_entry(h, h->info.hook_entry[i]));
+		entry2index(h, get_entry(h, h->info.underflow[i]));
+	}
+
+	assert(h->info.size
+	       >= h->info.num_entries * (sizeof(STRUCT_ENTRY)
+					 +sizeof(STRUCT_STANDARD_TARGET)));
+
+	assert(h->entries.size
+	       >= (h->new_number
+		   * (sizeof(STRUCT_ENTRY)
+		      + sizeof(STRUCT_STANDARD_TARGET))));
+	assert(strcmp(h->info.name, h->entries.name) == 0);
+
+	i = 0; n = 0;
+	was_return = 0;
+
+	/* Check all the entries. */
+//	ENTRY_ITERATE(h->entries.entries, h->entries.size,
+//		      check_entry, &i, &n, user_offset, &was_return, h);
+
+	assert(i == h->new_number);
+	assert(n == h->entries.size);
+
+	/* Final entry must be error node */
+	assert(strcmp(GET_TARGET(index2entry(h, h->new_number-1))
+		      ->u.user.name,
+		      ERROR_TARGET) == 0);
+}
+#endif /*NDEBUG*/
-- 
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